

# WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

*Editors:* Gordon Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science  
Vincent Wright, Nuffield College, Oxford  
*Reviews Editor:* Geoffrey Pridham, University of Bristol

## EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Malcolm Anderson, University of Edinburgh	Jan-Erik Lane, Umeå University, Sweden
Suzanne Berger, M.I.T.	Yves Mény, University of Paris II
Klaus von Beyme, University of Heidelberg	Peter Merkl, University of California, Santa Barbara
Hans Daalder, University of Leiden	Stefano Passigli, University of Florence
Ralf Dahrendorf, St Antony's College, Oxford	F. F. Ridley, University of Liverpool
Alfred Grosser, ENSP, Paris	Kurt Sontheimer, University of Munich
Jack Hayward, University of Hull	Sidney Tarrow, Cornell University
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Washington University	

Manuscripts, editorial correspondence, books for review and advertisement enquiries should be sent to:

**The Administrative Editor, West European Politics, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., Gainsborough House, 11 Gainsborough Road, London E11 1RS  
Tel: 01-530 4226**

Before commencing the final draft of their article, prospective contributors are advised to consult the NOTES on the inside back cover.

Authors should retain at least one complete copy of their article; manuscripts are returned only if accompanied by a stamped addressed envelope (or International Reply Coupon). While every care is taken, the publisher cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to authors' manuscripts.

© Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1987

*All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.*

**Annual Subscription:** Institutions: £60.00 (\$95.00) postage included  
Individuals: £33.00 (\$50.00) postage included  
Single issues: £16.00 (\$25.00) postage included

Published in January, April, July and October by  
**FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED**  
Gainsborough House, 11 Gainsborough Road  
LONDON E11 1RS, England

## Towards Europeanisation and Realignment?: The Irish General Election, February 1987

Brendan O'Leary

The Fine Gael-Labour coalition, which had governed the Irish Republic since November 1982, disintegrated on 21 January 1987. The coalition collapsed because of policy differences over the profound crisis of the Irish economy. The Labour Party had already signalled its intention to fight the next election on its own. Labour refused to support the budgetary retrenchments proposed by their coalition partners, and withdrew their ministers from the government. The general election was called for 17 February. Dr Garret Fitzgerald, the outgoing *Taoiseach* and Fine Gael leader, decided upon a four-week campaign, long by Irish standards. He hoped to recover support for his party, and to prevent Fianna Fail, led by Charles Haughey, from obtaining a governing majority. During the campaign he also indicated his willingness to develop a different coalition, and counselled Fine Gael voters to cast their second preferences for the newly formed Progressive Democrats.

Fitzgerald succeeded in one of his negative objectives. Fianna Fail's first preference support dropped 8 per cent in the course of the campaign, most of that fall occurring in the final week. Fianna Fail is the largest party in the *Dail* but has insufficient seats to form a majority government – just as after the three general elections which took place during 1981–82. On 10 March, after an 82–82 tied vote in the *Dail*, Haughey was elected *Taoiseach* by the casting vote of the *Ceann Comhairle*.<sup>1</sup> He owed his election to the support of an Independent Fianna Fail deputy, Neil Blaney, and the absention of an independent socialist deputy, Tony Gregory. But despite the precarious minority position of the Fianna Fail government, it is expected to survive at least a year. This judgement rests on three observations. First, there is no obvious macro-economic policy likely to unite the opposition parties into a concerted effort to bring down the government. The centre and right opposition (Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats) are obliged to back any budgetary retrenchments put forward by Fianna Fail. The left opposition (Labour, the Workers' Party and the two socialist deputies) will oppose any cut-backs in public expenditure, and thus constrain the centre-right opposition into supporting the government or abstaining. Second, Fitzgerald resigned the leadership of Fine Gael immediately after Haughey's election as *Taoiseach*, throwing his party into brief disarray. Alan Dukes, widely regarded as Fitzgerald's heir apparent, won the ensuing leadership contest, but will require time to consolidate his leadership, and to re-orient Fine Gael's political strategy after 15 years of formal and informal coalition with Labour. Finally, Haughey's decision to accept the Anglo-Irish Agree-

ment has removed from the agenda the most obvious issue likely to bring down a Fianna Fail administration.<sup>2</sup> Ironically, had he made his *voile-face* earlier, Haughey would now lead a majority administration. If he had accepted the Agreement he would have removed part of the impetus for the formation of the Progressive Democrats, and he would have removed one of his major electoral liabilities.

#### PARTY PERFORMANCES IN THE ELECTION

##### *Fianna Fail*

Fianna Fail's 44.1 per cent of first preference votes was its worst performance since 1961. Although the party almost obtained an overall majority of seats, the predominant party in the Irish political system has not won a governing majority in a general election for a decade – since a resounding victory in 1977.<sup>3</sup> Fianna Fail's first-preference performance varied considerably across the country. In Limerick East, where Desmond O'Malley, the leader of the Progressive Democrats, enjoyed a notable triumph, Fianna Fail's first-preference vote dropped by 21.1 per cent. Fianna Fail losses in Galway West (–15.4 per cent), Limerick West (–10.9 per cent), and Cork South Central (–6.9 per cent) were also dramatic. These losses were largely due to the intervention of Progressive Democrats who were well known ex-Fianna Fail notables. In Munster their vote dropped by 4.4 per cent, but in Dublin City and County they increased their first-preference share by 2.2 per cent.

Fianna Fail's major losses were counterfactual. They lost voters they might otherwise have been expected to obtain from the swing against the governing parties. Potential middle-class Fine Gael defectors reacting against the government had a choice, and were attracted by the economic liberalism of the Progressive Democrats. However, on their nationalist flank Fianna Fail also lost first-preference votes to Sinn Fein in border constituencies (Donegal North-East and Sligo–Leitrim) as well as in Dublin Central. The terminal transfers of eliminated Sinn Fein candidates returned to Fianna Fail, which was not the case with the transfers of the Progressive Democrats, many of which ended up with Fine Gael.

##### *Fine Gael*

Fine Gael lost 25 per cent of its Dail representation, and its 27.1 per cent share of first-preference votes was its worst tally since 1957. However the party won 30.7 per cent of the seats in the Dail, benefiting from STV, largely at the expense of the Progressive Democrats. This fact is not surprising given that most Progressive Democrat votes, in aggregate, came from Fine Gael. The most spectacular example of Fine Gael winning other parties' transfers took place in Dublin North Central (a four-seat constituency). Here Fianna Fail won two seats with 50 per cent of the first-preference vote, but Fine Gael won the other two seats with only 24 per cent of the first-preference vote!

However, the Fine Gael first-preference vote went down throughout the country. It fell by around 10 per cent in Leinster, Munster and

Connacht/Ulster and haemorrhaged in Dublin City and County, falling a full 17.4 per cent. A dramatic surge to the Progressive Democrats of 13.6 per cent in Dublin accounts for most of Fine Gael's losses here, but confirmation must await detailed scrutiny of voters' preferences.<sup>4</sup>

##### *The Labour Party*

Labour paid for the unpopularity of the coalition government, with a further drop of nearly a third in its already small first-preference vote. Fine Gael, engaged in competition with Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, had some success in displacing the burden of the government's record on to Labour's shoulders. Much the same strategy was adopted by the cadres of the Workers' Party. Labour's first-preference vote, 6.4 per cent, was its worst since 1933, and their leader Dick Spring had to endure the humiliation of a recount before being re-elected by four votes as the third candidate in a three-seat constituency. Labour lost five seats and gained three. The losses and gains have shifted the party firmly in the direction of refusing coalition with any party to their right. But Labour's long-run prospects as a single party do not seem bright, despite the election of some capable deputies, such as Michael D. Higgins in Galway. Several candidates literally scraped through by a handful of votes, and seven of Labour's 12 deputies were elected in five-seat constituencies (where small parties have a better chance of obtaining a seat).<sup>5</sup>

##### *The Established Parties*

The remarkable feature of the election was that all the established parties lost ground. The combined first-preference vote for the two major parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, at 71.1 per cent was their lowest since 1948. As Table 1 shows, the combined first-preference vote of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Labour Party was also the smallest since 1948 (77.6 per cent). Almost a quarter of the electorate did not cast their first-preference vote for the three established parties of the Irish political system. This expression of preferences contrasts dramatically with the 94.4 per cent average combined share of first preferences obtained by these three hardy perennials between 1965 and 1982. These facts make credible the claim that the Irish party system has undergone a shock-wave if not, as yet, a fundamental transformation.

##### *The New and Emergent Parties*

The most dramatic change since 1982 is the emergence of a large new party, the Progressive Democrats, formed by dissident Fianna Fail deputies during the last Dail. They took 11.8 per cent of the first-preference vote and went past Labour as the third largest party in the Dail. But despite their origins as a party of Fianna Fail notables, the Progressive Democrats also managed to attract deputies from Fine Gael, and in the end drew most of their electoral support from former Fine Gael voters – as is suggested graphically in Figure 2. The Progressive Democrats did not contest all constituencies and their 2.9 per cent share in Connacht/Ulster reflects both this fact as well as confirming the highly urban character of

the party. They projected themselves as a tax-cutting party, and were not ashamed of being a right-wing bourgeois party. The Progressive Democrats share of seats did not reach their share of the first preference vote, as the proportionally index in Table 2 confirms.<sup>6</sup> They did best where the system was most proportional — 10 of their 14 deputies were elected in five seat constituencies.

But the Progressive Democrats were not the only new party to contest the election on a serious basis. Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, while long in existence, contested the elections on a non-abstentionist platform for the first time since the Irish civil war in the 1920s. By contrast with the Progressive Democrats, Sinn Fein's first-preference performance was a derisory 1.9 per cent. Most Sinn Fein votes came from the Fianna Fail bloc and returned there after the elimination of Sinn Fein candidates.

On the left, the Workers' Party, Ireland's functional equivalent of a Eurocommunist Party, fared considerably better than Sinn Fein — with whom they share a recent common ancestry. Their 3.8 per cent first-preference vote and the election of four deputies, was their best performance to date, and made all the sweeter for them because they outpolled Labour in Dublin. One of their candidates, Proinsias de Rosca, topped the poll in Dublin North West. Like the Progressive Democrats they also did not stand in all constituencies and are an urban party. Both the Workers' Party and the Progressive Democrats are capable of long-run party-building. They represent, on the left and right respectively, the Europeanisation of Irish politics. Both parties locate themselves on the conventional European left-right ideological spectrum, have transcended their origins in nationalist politics, and are explicitly secular. They also pose sufficient competition to both Labour and Fine Gael, the most modernised of the three established parties, to discourage them from repeating their recent alignment in the near future. A socialist parliamentary and electoral coalition between Labour and the Workers' Party, and a liberal coalition between Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats has been made possible by the simultaneous fragmentation of opposition to Fianna Fail and by Fianna Fail's failure to capitalise on that fragmentation. Whether 'natural affinities' will be translated into pacts between the parties of the left on the one hand, and of the centre-right on the other, will be the most intriguing feature of the newly elected Dail. With Dukes as the social democratic leader of Fine Gael it seems likely that Fine Gael strategy will initially be to encroach on both Labour and Progressive Democrat support. And on the left there remain many differences between Labour and the Workers' Party.

### The Results

The number of deputies each party had on the dissolution of the Dail and after the 1987 election is shown in Table 2, along with the positions after the November 1982 election. Table 2 also shows the proportionality index for the major parties.<sup>8</sup> The parties' share of the first-preference votes in the 1987 election and the contrast with the last general election, held in November 1982, is also shown in the pie charts in Figure 1. Finally, the

TABLE 1  
FIANNA FAIL'S, FINE GAEL'S AND LABOUR'S SHARE OF FIRST  
PREFERENCES, 1943-87

	Fianna Fail	Fine Gael	Labour	Total (FF+FG+LAB)
1943	41.9	23.1	15.7	80.7
1944	48.8	20.5	8.8	78.2
1948	41.9	19.8	8.7	70.4
1951	46.3	25.8	11.4	83.5
1954	43.4	32.0	12.1	87.5
1957	48.3	26.6	9.1	84.0
1961	43.8	32.0	11.6	87.4
1965	47.7	34.1	15.4	97.2
1969	45.7	34.1	17.0	96.8
1973	46.2	35.1	13.7	95.0
1977	50.6	30.5	11.6	92.7
1981	45.3	36.5	9.9	91.7
1982	47.3	37.3	9.1	93.7
1982	45.2	39.2	9.4	93.8
1987	44.1	27.1	6.4	77.6

Sources: *Irish Times*, MRBI, M. Gallagher, 1985, *Political Parties in the Republic of Ireland*.

longitudinal graph in Figure 2 shows first-preference support for the parties in *Irish Times*/MRBI polls between the two elections of 1982 and 1987.

### KEY ISSUES IN THE CAMPAIGN

The central issues in the general election campaign were economic. After a period of unparalleled growth and prosperity since the early 1960s the Irish economy has been severely affected both by the global recession and the long-run consequences of the external borrowing strategy embarked upon by the Fianna Fail government between 1977 and 1979, and continued by subsequent governments. During the coalition government's term of office unemployment rose to 20 per cent of the adult work-force, by far the highest proportion in the EEC, and emigration from Ireland recommenced on a large scale. One in three of the population were reported to be dependent upon welfare. The national debt reached 150 per cent of GNP, and exchequer borrowing 13 per cent of GNP. Talk of the Latin-Americanisation of Irish politics was not uncommon among the Irish intelligentsia.

The key question which had faced the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government was simple: How to pay for the crisis? Labour argued that increasing the fiscal capacity of the state, especially by increasing the taxes on farmers and the self-employed, and furthering the wealth tax, were better solutions than cutting welfare expenditures. Fine Gael, keenly aware of competition on their right from the Progressive Democrats, shifted their fiscal and monetary orientation from the social democratic tinge they had acquired under Fitzgerald's promptings from the mid-

1960s. The break-up of the coalition was thus inevitable. Remarkably, despite offering retrenchment, Fine Gael succeeded in securing some of the political and economic agenda for the election, and recouping some of their vote in the course of the campaign. Fine Gael spent part of its election campaign competing for the austerity ticket with the Progressive Democrats, contending that there was little room for tax cuts. The economic optimism of Fianna Fail was widely disbelieved, especially as it attempted to campaign on a 'catch-all' election platform, promising that nobody would be harmed by their economic administration. They attempted to brand both Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats as unpatriotic class-parties, traducers of national self-esteem, and incapable of strong government. Fianna Fail's stance proved less credible than in the past. It was belatedly obliged to accept the gravity of Ireland's economic crisis. The claim that it alone could provide a strong stable government did not work its alleged magic.

TABLE 2  
PARTY POSITIONS IN THE DAIL BEFORE AND AFTER


Party	Seats		Pre-election 1987		Post-election 1987		Net Gain
	1982	1987	1987	1987	1987	1987	
Fianna Fail	77 (102.6) <sup>†</sup>	71	81 (110.6)	101.5 <sup>*</sup>			10.15 <sup>*</sup>
Fine Gael	70 (107.5)	68	51 (113.2)	-17 [-19]			-2 [-4]
Labour	16 (102.1)	14	12 (112.5)	-2 [-4]			9 [14]
Progressive Democrats	0	5	14 (71.18)	9 [14]			2 [2]
Workers Party	2 (36.6)	2	4 (63.5)	0 [0]			-3 [0]
Independent Fianna Fail	1	1	1				1 [1]
Independents	2	2	5				
Democratic Socialist Party	0	0	1				

Key: † Figures in brackets ( ) are the proportionality index.

\* Net Gains without brackets indicate immediate changes since the dissolution of the Dail, while Net Gains in square brackets [ ] indicate changes since the last election in November 1982.

The most important secondary issues in the campaign were the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the leadership of the major parties. Haughey equivocated on the Anglo-Irish Agreement, right up until the moment he became Taoiseach. Haughey's tactics were foolish, given his eventual willingness to concede support for the Agreement. The Agreement had the enthusiastic support of all the other major parties, the Northern Irish constitutional nationalists, the SDLP, and over 60 per cent of the Republic's electorate. The sole rationale that one can provide for his stance was his desire to protect his party from Sinn Fein's challenge. But the electoral benefits of successfully beating off the ultra-nationalist challenge did not exceed the costs. Haughey's evasive stance cost him dear in a television encounter with Fitzgerald, and it is plausible to attribute the limiting of a great proportion of the swing against Fianna Fail in the last week of the campaign to this episode.

FIGURE 1  
PARTIES SHARES OF FIRST PREFERENCES NOVEMBER 1982 AND FEBRUARY 1987



Key: FF = Fianna Fail, FG = Fine Gael, LAB = Labour, WP = Workers Party, PD = Progressive Democrats, SF = Sinn Fein, I & O = Others and Independents.


Sources: See Table 1.

#### CONCLUSION: TOWARDS EUROPEANISATION AND RE-ALIGNMENT?

The Irish party system has undergone a major shock-wave, confirmed in the February 1987 election. It is conceivable that the wave will be singular, merely symptomatic of a widespread but temporary protest at Ireland's economic crisis and discontent with the established political élites. And it may be that the successful resolution of Ireland's economic crises, together with a Fianna Fail and Fine Gael pact to alter the electoral system, will re-stabilise the old party system. However, there are good reasons for supposing that the February 1987 election portends greater Europeanisation and re-alignment.

Ireland has undergone seismic changes since the early 1960s. An agrarian state with an ex-colonial administrative and urban structure has been partially transformed. Despite the blandishments of its tourist brochures, contemporary Ireland has much of the diversity, complexity, unevenness and inequalities of advanced industrial capitalism. Ireland has also been partially internationalised – in its economy, culture, and its polity. Economic dependence on Britain has been reduced, but has had as its corollary increased dependence upon external investment from Europe and North America. The educated Irish élites are increasingly both European and secularised, whereas popular culture is increasingly American. The speed of these transformations has undermined some of the underpinnings of the traditional party system.

FIGURE 2  
AREA CHART OF PARTY SUPPORT BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1982 AND  
FEBRUARY 1987



Source: MRBI/Irish Times poll data.

The subsequent alterations in the Irish social structure have provided a potential social base for European liberalism. Anti-partitionism, Catholic fervour and a distinctively Irish identity are experienced as parochial constraints by significant segments of the new Irish bourgeoisie. For them Fianna Fail's nationalism has lost credibility, and is regarded as a mixture of quixotic utopianism and opportunism, irrelevant to the management of a modern society. The recent referendums which made abortion a constitutional crime and prevented the legalisation of divorce were experienced by this bourgeoisie as the Pyrrhic triumphs of backward, peasant Ireland fighting its last political battle before submergence in the tidal wave of modernisation. The language of fashionable cosmopolitan impatience litters the speech of the Progressive Democrats and many supporters of Fine Gael.

But it is also true that the partial transformation of the social structure has provided a potential social base for European socialism, albeit a

weaker one. The last two decades of Irish industrialisation have not, of course, produced a Marxist proletariat. However, industrialisation has produced increasing inequalities, stark indicators of class differentiation, and the standard stresses of urbanisation, occurring in tandem with a weakening in the Church's hegemony in Irish society. Social structural transformations are therefore favourable for the emergence and mobilisation of standard European ideological cleavages.

However, structural transformations do not spontaneously produce new political mobilisations, nor terminate traditional political parties. Politics is autonomous from economics. And arguably between the early 1960s and early 1980s, the Irish party system successfully adapted to the alterations in its environment. Fianna Fail widened its ideological scope, became rather like a European Christian Democratic party, oriented towards capitalist economic growth and a degree of redistribution towards welfareism. Fine Gael adapted even more dramatically, combining within its ranks traditional Catholic authoritarians, market liberals and recognisable social democrats advocating social justice. Labour failed to make advances not only because of the constraints of its coalition with Fine Gael, but also because of the very skill of the two major parties in modernising their appeals. By the late 1970s and early 1980s political scientists began to find that Irish politics did indeed have social bases in the senses that party support correlated significantly with particular class indicators, that political parties' manifestos could be placed coherently upon a left-right axis, and that party competition centred upon welfare state management rather than nationalism or the civil war.<sup>9</sup>

Two developments prevented the full adaptation of the established party system to transformations in the social structure. First, Haughey's election to the leadership of Fianna Fail halted that party's embrace with modernity. His espousal of both traditional nationalism and traditional Catholic social values broke an emergent consensus across the party élites. Haughey's leadership also created serious disruptions within Fianna Fail which eventually led to the formation of the Progressive Democrats, explicitly committed to economic liberalism and the termination of vestigial traces of civil war politics. Their successful formation forced Fine Gael to place outer limits on its social democratic ambitions. The dynamics of party competition and governing in recession prevented Fine Gael exploiting the cracks which appeared in the Fianna Fail monolith. Second, the duration of global economic crisis, in the context of greatly increased dependence upon international relations, weakened the plausibility and coherence of the growth-based strategies around which both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael had reconstructed their appeals. Both the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic versions of this growth ideology espoused by Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have been severely shattered, making realignments on the left and right of Irish politics more likely than at any time since the formation of the state. These contingent and external developments have combined to make the 1987 election a critical turning point which presages a fuller pluralisation of Irish politics and society. Ireland's justly renowned statesman Garret Fitzgerald has

gone, but one of his objectives is being indirectly realised. Irish politics is becoming more pluralist and secular. But it is much less obvious that with more pluralism Ireland will experience the realisation of Fitzgerald's other objective, greater social justice.

## NOTES

This note forms part of a wider study of the Irish general election being conducted by Colm O'Murchearraigh and the author at the London School of Economics. Analysing survey evidence on the social bases of party support cannot be encompassed in this brief election report. Many thanks to Colm O'Murchearraigh who bears no responsibility for my errors of fact and judgement.

1. The *Ceann Comhairle* is the Speaker of the Irish Assembly, the *Dail*. He was elected as an independent T.D.
2. For an account of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the positions taken by Irish political parties, see *inter alia* Anthony Kenny, *The Road to Hillsborough* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1986), and Brendan O'Leary, 'The Anglo-Irish Agreement: Folly or Statecraft?', *West European Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1987).
3. The fact that Fianna Fail none the less came so close to obtaining a governing majority (48.8 per cent of the seats with just over 44.1 per cent of the first preference vote) confirms that STV is not well described as a system of proportional representation. Rather, STV achieves accurate representation of preference rankings and intensities as opposed to strict proportionality with electors' first preferences. For illuminating commentary on Ireland's electoral system see Peter Mair and Michael Laver, 'Proportionality, P.R. and S.T.V. in Ireland', *Political Studies*, Vol. xxiii, No. 4 (1975), pp. 491-500.
4. The author and C. O'Murchearraigh are currently engaged in a detailed scrutiny of preference transfers.
5. Irish constituencies are divided into three-, four- and five-seaters. To achieve the quota (calculated by the Droop formula:  $\frac{N+1}{100+1}$ , where N is the number of seats to be filled) is easier in a five-seater constituency (16.6% + 1) than in a four-seater (20% + 1) or three-seater constituency (25% + 1). No less than 20 out of the 34 seats (59%) obtained by non-Fianna Fail and non-Fine Gael candidates were won in five-seater constituencies.
6. The proportionality index, devised by Cornelius O'Leary, is calculated by this formula:

$$\frac{\text{Seats} \times 100}{\text{Total Seats}} - \frac{1 \times 100}{1} \\ \text{\% Share of First Preference Vote}$$

A score of 100 indicates perfect proportionality. A score of >100 (or <100) indicates that a party's share of seats has exceeded (or is less than) its share of first preference votes.

7. Throughout Ireland (the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland) Sinn Fein can now claim to have the electoral support of just over 4% of the combined electorates. This performance does not help their claim to speak for the Irish nation, and may well renew dissension within Sinn Fein and IRA ranks over the viability of simultaneously pursuing armed insurrection and parliamentary competition.

8. See note 4.
9. J. Whyte's article, 'Ireland: Politics Without Social Bases', in R. Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 619-51 has been criticised by *inter alia*, R. Sinnott, 'Interpretations of the Irish Party System', *European Journal of Political Research*, 12, (1984), pp. 289-307, M. Laver, 'Party

## THE IRISH GENERAL ELECTION 1987

choice and social structure in Ireland', *Irish Political Studies*, 1 (1986), pp. 45-55, M. Laver, 'Measuring Patterns of Party Support in Ireland', *The Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1986), pp. 95-100, and P. Mair, 'Locating Irish Political Parties on a Left-Right Dimension: An Empirical Inquiry', *Political Studies*, xxxiv (1986), pp. 456-65.